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Abstract
Deep neural networks (DNNs) are notorious for their vulnerability to adversarial
attacks, which are small perturbations added to their input images to mislead
their prediction. Detection of adversarial examples is, therefore, a fundamental
requirement for robust classification frameworks. In this work, we present a method
for detecting such adversarial attacks, which is suitable for any pre-trained neural
network classifier. We use influence functions to measure the impact of every
training sample on the validation set data. From the influence scores, we find the
most supportive training samples for any given validation example. A k-nearest
neighbor (k-NN) model fitted on the DNN’s activation layers is employed to search
for the ranking of these supporting training samples. We observe that these samples
are highly correlated with the nearest neighbors of the normal inputs, while this
correlation is much weaker for adversarial inputs. We train an adversarial detector
using the k-NN ranks and distances and show that it successfully distinguishes
adversarial examples, getting state-of-the-art results on four attack methods with
three datasets.
1 Introduction
Deep Neural Networks (DNNs) are vastly employed in both the academy and industry, achieving
state-of-the-art results in many domains such as computer vision Krizhevsky et al. [2012], Schroff
et al. [2015], Voulodimos et al. [2018], natural language processing Bahdanau et al. [2014], Kim
[2014], and speech recognition Hinton et al. [2012], Zhang et al. [2016]. However, studies have shown
that DNNs are vulnerable to adversarial examples Goodfellow et al. [2015], Szegedy et al. [2014],
which are specially crafted perturbations on their input. Adversarial attacks generate such examples
that fool machine learning models, inducing them to predict erroneously with high confidence, while
being imperceptible to humans. Adversarial subspaces of different DNN classifiers tend to overlap,
which makes some adversarial examples generated for a surrogate model fool also other different
unseen DNNs Tramer et al. [2017]. This makes adversarial attacks a real threat to any machine
learning model and thus should be kept in mind while deploying a DNN.
The vulnerability of neural networks puts into question their usage in sensitive applications, where an
opponent may provide modified inputs to cause misidentifications. For this reason, many methods
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Figure 1: The correspondence between the helpful examples based on influence functions and the
k-nearest neighbours (k-NN) in the embedding space of a DNN can help to distinguish adversarial
examples from normal ones. We present (using PCA) the embedding space of a DNN for a normal
example (black star) with its adversarial version (brown X) along with their k-NN (k=25) and 25
most helpful samples. Note that for the normal example, the helpful samples highly correlate with
the k-NN in the embedding space. Yet, in the adversarial case, these samples are far from each other.
This observation leads us to a technique for detecting adversarial attacks.
have been developed to face this challenge. They can be mainly divided into two groups: 1) proactive
defense methods, which aim at improving the robustness of DNNs to adversarial examples, and 2)
reactive detection techniques that do not change the DNN but rather try to find whether an attack is
associated with a certain input or not.
Contribution. In this work, we focus on the reactive detection problem. We propose a novel strategy
for detecting adversarial attacks that can be applied to any pre-trained neural network. The core
idea of the algorithm is that there should be a correspondence between the training data and the
classification of the network. If this relationship breaks then it is very likely that we are in the case of
an adversarial input.
To this end, we use two “metrics” to check the impact of the training data on the network decision.
The first is influence functions Koh and Liang [2017], which determines how data points in the
training set influence the decision of the network for a given test sample. This metric measures how
much a small upweighting of a specific training point in the model’s loss function affects the loss of a
testing point. Thus, it provides us with a measure of how much a test sample classification is affected
by each training sample.
Second, we apply a k-nearest neighbor (k-NN) classifier at the embedding space of the network.
Various recent works Papernot and McDaniel [2018], Do¨ring et al. [2017], Jiang et al. [2018], Cohen
et al. [2018] demonstrate a high correlation between the network softmax output and the decision
of a k-NN applied at the embedding space of this network (where the neighbors are chosen from
the training set). They basically show that the network’s decision relies on the nearest neighbors
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resemblance in the embedding space. Thus, the distance in that space may serve as a measure for the
effect of an example on the network output.
Given the influence function and k-NN based measures, we turn to combine them together to generate
a novel strategy to detect adversarial examples. The rationale behind our approach is that for a normal
input, its k-NN training samples (nearest neighbors in the embedding space) and the most helpful
training samples (found using the influence function) should correlate. Yet, for adversarial examples
this correlation should break and thus, it will serve as an indication that an attack is happening.
Figure 1 illustrates this relationship between the k-NN and the most helpful training samples. The
black star and brown X denote a normal and its corresponding adversarial image from CIFAR-10
validation set; the plot is of the embedding space projected using PCA fitted on the training set. For
each sample (normal/adv), we find its 25 nearest neighbors (blue circles/red downward triangles)
in the DNN embedding space; in addition, we find its 25 most helpful training examples from the
training set (marked as blue squares and red triangles, respectively). Note that the nearest neighbors
and the top most helpful training samples of the normal image are very close in the PCA embedding
space, whereas the adversarial image does not exhibit the same correspondence between the training
samples.
To check the correlation between the two, we pursue the following strategy: For an unseen input
sample, we take the most influential examples from the training set chosen by the influence functions.
Then, we check their distance ranking in the embedding space of the network (i.e., what value of k
will cause k-NN to take them into account) and their L2 distance from the input sample’s embedding
vector. Finally, we use these k-NN features to train a simple Logistic Regression (LR) for detecting
whether the input is adversarial or not.
We evaluate our detection strategy on various attack methods and datasets showing its advantage over
other leading detection techniques. The results confirm the hypothesis claimed in previous works on
the resemblance between k-NN applied on the embedding space and the DNN decision, and show
how it can be used for detecting adversarial examples.
2 Related work
In this section, we briefly review existing papers on adversarial attacks and defenses, and related
theory.
Theory: Madry et al. [2018] used the framework of robust optimization and showed results of
adversarial training. They found that projected gradient descent (PGD) is an optimal first order
adversary, and employing it in the DNN training leads to optimal robustness against any first order
attack. Simon-Gabriel et al. [2019] demonstrated that DNNs’ vulnerability to adversarial attacks is
increased with the gradient of the training loss as a function of the inputs. They also found that this
vulnerability does not depend on the DNN model.
Fawzi et al. [2017] studied the geometry and complexity of the functions learned by DNNs and
provided empirical analysis of the curvatures of their decision boundaries. They showed that a DNN
classifier is most vulnerable where its decision boundary is positively curved and that natural images
are usually located in the vicinity of flat decision boundaries. These findings are also supported by
Moosavi-Dezfooli et al. [2017b], who found that positively curved decision boundaries increase the
likelihood that a small universal perturbation would fool a DNN classifier.
Some works provided guarantees to certify robustness of the network. Hein and Andriushchenko
[2017] formalized a formal upper bound for the noise required to flip a network prediction, while
Sinha et al. [2018] provided an efficient and fast guarantee of robustness for the worst-case population
performance, with high probability.
Adversarial attacks: One of the simplest and fastest attack methods is the fast gradient sign method
(FGSM) Goodfellow et al. [2015]; in this method the attacker linearly fits the cross entropy loss
around the attacked sample and lightly perturbs the image pixels in the direction of the gradient loss.
This is a fast one-step attack, which is very easy to deploy on raw input images.
The Jacobian-based saliency map attack (JSMA) Papernot et al. [2016] takes a different approach.
Instead of mildly changing all image pixels, this attack is crafted on the L0 norm, finding one or
two pixels which induce the largest change in the loss and modify only them. This is a strong attack,
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achieving 97% success rate by modifying only 4.02% of the input features on average. Yet, it is
iterative and costly.
Deepfool proposed by Moosavi-Dezfooli et al. [2016] is a non-targeted attack1 that creates an
adversarial example by moving the attacked input sample to its closest decision boundary, assuming
an affine classifier. In reality most DNNs are very non linear, however, the authors used an iterative
method, linearizing the classifier around the test sample at every iteration. Compared to FGSM and
JSMA, Deepfool performs less perturbations to the input. It was also employed in the Universal
Perturbations attack by Moosavi-Dezfooli et al. [2017a], which is an iterative attack that aims at
fooling a group of images using the same minimal, universal perturbation applied on all of them.
Carlini and Wagner [2017b] proposed a targeted attack2 (denoted as CW) to impact the defensive
distillation method Papernot et al. [2016]. The CW attack is resilient against most adversarial detection
methods. In another work Carlini and Wagner [2017a] provided an optimization framework, which
includes a defense-specific loss as a regularization term . This optimization-based attack is argued
to be the most effective to date for a white-box threat model, here the adversary knows everything
related to the trained DNN: training data, architecture, hyper-parameters, weights, etc.
Adversarial defenses: A wide range of proactive defense approaches have been proposed, including
adversarial (re)training Goodfellow et al. [2015], Kurakin et al. [2017], Trame`r et al. [2018], Shaham
et al. [2018], Miyato et al. [2015], distillation networks Papernot et al. [2016], gradient masking
Trame`r et al. [2018], feature squeezing Xu et al. [2018], network input regularization Ross and
Doshi-Velez [2017], Jakubovitz and Giryes [2018], output regularization Hein and Andriushchenko
[2017], adjusting weights of correctly predicted labels Rozsa et al. [2018], and Parseval networks
Cisse et al. [2017].
However, those defenses can be evaded by the optimization-based attack Carlini and Wagner [2017a],
either wholly or partially. Since there are no known intrinsic properties that differentiate adversarial
samples from regular images, proactive adversarial defense is extremely challenging. Instead, recent
works have focused on reactive adversarial detection methods, which aim at distinguishing adversarial
images from natural images, based on features extracted from DNN layers Metzen et al. [2017], Li
and Li [2017], Rouhani et al. [2018] or from a learned encoder Meng and Chen [2017]. Feinman et al.
[2017] proposed a LR detector based on Kernel density and Bayesian uncertainty features.
Ma et al. [2018] characterized the dimensional properties of the adversarial subspaces regions and
proposed to use a property called Local Intrinsic Dimentionaloty (LID) . LID describes the rate of
expansion in the number of data objects as the distance from the reference sample increases. The
authors estimated the LID score at every DNN layer using extreme value theory, where the smallest
NN distances are considered as extreme events associated with the lower tail of the data samples’
underlying distance distribution. Given a pretrained network and a dataset of normal examples, the
authors applied on every sample: 1) Adversarial attack. 2) Addition of Gaussian Noise. The natural
and noisy images were considered as negative (non-adversarial) class and the adversarial images were
considered as positive class. For each image (natural/noisy/adversarial) they calculated a LID score at
every DNN layer. Lastly, a LR model was fitted on the LID features for the adversarial detection task.
Papernot and McDaniel [2018] proposed the Deep k-Nearest Neighbors (DkNN) algorithm to estimate
better the prediction, confidence, and credibility for a given test sample. Using a pretrained network,
they fitted a k-NN model at every layer. Next, they used a left-out calibration set to estimate the
nonconformity of every test sample for label j, counting the number of nearest neighbors along the
DNN layer which differs from j. They showed that when an adversarial attack is made on a test
sample, the real label displays less correspondence with the k-NN labels from the DNN activations
along the layers.
Lee et al. [2018] trained generative classifiers using the DNN activations of the training set on every
layer to detect adversarial examples by applying a Mahalanobis distance-based confidence score. First,
for every class and every layer, they computed the empirical mean and covariance of the activations
induced by the training samples. Next, using the above class-conditional Gaussian distributions, they
calculated the Mahalanobis distance between a test sample and its nearest class-conditional Gaussian.
1Non-targeted attacks are adversarial attacks which aim to make the prediction incorrect regardless of the
spricifc erroneous class.
2Targeted attacks are adversarial attacks which aim to make the prediction classified to a particular erroneous
class.
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These distances are used as features to train a LR classifier for the adversarial detection task. The
authors claimed that using the Mahalanobis distance is significantly more effective than the Euclidean
distance employed by Ma et al. [2018] and showed improved detection results.
3 Method
We hypothesize that the DNN predictions are influenced by the k-NN of the training data in their
hidden layers, especially in the embedding layer, which is the penultimate activation layer in the
DNN classifier. If so, in order to fool the network, an adversarial attack must move the test sample
towards a ”bad” subspace in the embedding space, where harmful training data can cause the network
to misclassify the correct label. To inspect our hypothesis, we fitted a k-NN model on the DNN’s
activation layers, and also employed the influence functions as used in Koh and Liang [2017].
Influence functions can interpret a DNN by pointing out which of the training samples helped the
DNN to make its prediction, and which training samples were harmful, i.e., inhibited the network
from its prediction. Koh and Liang [2017] suggested to measure the influence a train sample z has on
the loss of a specific test sample ztest, by the term:
Iup,loss(z, ztest) = −∇θL(ztest, θ)TH−1θ ∇θL(z, θ), (1)
where H is the Hessian of the machine learning model, L is its loss, and θ are the model parameters.
For each test example ztest, we calculate Eq. (1) per each training example z in the training set. Then,
we sort all Iup,loss(z, ztest) scores, determining the top M helpful and harmful training examples for
a specific ztest. Next, for each of the 2xM selected training points we find its rank and distance from
the testing example by fitting a k-NN model on the embedding space using all the training examples’
embedding vectors. We feed the embedding vector of each test sample ztest to the k-NN model to
extract all the nearest neighbors’ ranks (denoted asR) and distances (denoted D) of the examples in
the training set. TheR and D features can also be extracted from any other hidden activation layer
within the DNN, and not solely from the embedding vector.RM↑, DM↑ andRM↓, DM↓ are all the
ranks and distances of the helpful and harmful training examples, respectively.
We apply an adversarial attack on ztest and repeat the aforementioned process on the new, crafted
image. Both the normal and adversarial features (RM↑, DM↑, RM↓, DM↓) are used to train a LR
classifier for the adversarial detection task. The detector training scheme is described in Algorithm 1.
We name our adversarial detection method as Nearest Neighbor Influence Functions (NNIF). We
assume that the training, validation, and testing sets are not contaminated with adversarial examples,
as in Carlini and Wagner [2017a]. We start by generating an adversarial validation set from the
normal validation set (step 4). The M most helpful and harmful training examples associated with
the validation image prediction (either normal or adversarial) are found using the influence function
in step 22 (see supp. material for the INFLUENCEFUNCTION procedure). The NNIF features are
then evaluated by the k-NN model, extracting the ranks and distances (fromR and D) of the most
influential training points found above. This is done for both the normal validation images (step 8)
and for the adversarial images (step 12). This scheme can be carried out on the embedding layer
alone, or employed for all L activation layers within the DNN.
Finally, a LR classifier is trained using the NNIF features. Images from the test set are classified to
either adversarial (positive) or normal (negative) based on the NNIF features extracted from the M
most helpful/harmful training examples, (RM↑, DM↑,RM↓, DM↓).
Training our NNIF detector is very time consuming, requiring us to calculate Eq. (1) on the entire
training set for every validation image, having a time complexity of O(Ntrain ·Nval), where Ntrain
and Nval are the size of the training and validation sets, respectively. For an adversarial detection the
complexity time is O(Ntrain), since we need to find the top M helpful/harmful training examples
for every new incoming test image.
Papernot and McDaniel focused on improving credibility and robustness in DNN. They used the
nearest neighbors in the activation layers for interpretability. As an additional competing strategy, we
convert their original DkNN algorithm Papernot and McDaniel [2018] to an adversarial detection
method. This is done by collecting the empirical p-values calculated in the DkNN strategy and
formulating a reactive adversarial detector by training a LR model on these features. While NNIF
also use nearest neighbors, instead of inspecting the labels of the nearest neighbors, we examine the
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Algorithm 1 Nearest Neighbor Influence Functions
Input: Training set (Xtrain, Ytrain) and validation set (Xval, Yval)
Input: Pre-trained DNN with L activation layers and parameters θ
Input: M : Number of top influence samples to collect
Output: Detector(RM↑, DM↑,RM↓, DM↓) . An adversarial example detector
1: Ntrain = |Xtrain|, Nval = |Xval| . Number of examples in train- and validation-set
2: Initialize: R+norm=[], D
+
norm=[], R
−
norm=[], D
−
norm=[] . Normal image features
3: Initialize: R+adv=[], D
+
adv=[], R
−
adv=[], D
−
adv=[] . Adversarial image features
4: (Xadvval , Y
adv
val ) := adversarial attack on (Xval, Yval) . Generate a new adversarial dataset by
attacking the validation set
5: for l in [1,L] do
6: Fit k-NN[l] model on layer l. k = Ntrain
7: for (xi, yi) in (Xval, Yval) do
8: RM↑, DM↑,RM↓, DM↓ := NNFEATURES(xi, k-NN[l]) . Get NNIF helpful/harmful
features for normal images
9: R+norm.append(RM↑), D+norm.append(DM↑), R−norm.append(RM↓),
D−norm.append(DM↓)
10: end for
11: for (xi, yi) in (Xadvval , Y advval ) do
12: RM↑, DM↑,RM↓, DM↓ := NNFEATURES(xi, k-NN[l]) . Get NNIF helpful/harmful
features for adversarial images
13: R+adv .append(RM↑), D+adv .append(DM↑), R−adv .append(RM↓), D−adv .append(DM↓)
14: end for
15: end for
16: NNIFpos = (R+adv , D
+
adv , R
−
adv , D
−
adv)
17: NNIFneg = (R+norm, D
+
norm, R
−
norm, D
−
norm)
18: Detector(RM↑, DM↑,RM↓, DM↓) = train a classifier on (NNIFpos, NNIFneg)
19: procedure NNFEATURES(xi, k-NN[l]) . Collecting nearest neighbors features
20: Initialize: R+=[], D+=[], R−=[], D−=[] . image’s nearest neighbors features
21: R, D := Apply k-NN on activation layer l, get training examples’ ranks and L2 distances out
of activations of sample xi
22: H+inds, H
−
inds := INFLUENCEFUNCTION((xi, yi), (Xtrain, Ytrain)) . get indices of the
2xM most influencing training samples. This procedure is presented in the supp. material.
23: for j in H+inds do . Collect M helpful ranks and distances
24: R+.append(R[j])
25: D+.append(D[j])
26: end for
27: for j in H−inds do . Collect M harmful ranks and distances
28: R−.append(R[j])
29: D−.append(D[j])
30: end for
31: return R+, D+, R−, D−
32: end procedure
correlation between them and the image’s most helpful/harmful training examples using the influence
functions.
4 Results
This section shows the power of our NNIF adversarial detector against four adversarial attack
strategies: FGSM, JSMA, DeepFool, and CW (using L2 norm), as introduced in Section 2. We
selected these attacks for our experiments due to their effectiveness, diversity, and popularity. We
applied these attacks on three datasets: CIFAR-10, CIFAR-100 Krizhevsky [2009], and SVHN Netzer
et al. [2011]. NNIF performance is compared to the state-of-the-art LID and Mahalanobis detectors
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Figure 2: Comparison of AUC scores for detection of FGSM, JSMA, Deepfool and CW attacks
on three datasets: (a) CIFAR-10, (b) CIFAR-100, and (c) SVHN. The black, blue, green, and red
bars correspond to the DkNN, LID, Mahalanobis, and NNIF defense methods, respectively. The
hatched pattern bars correspond to AUC scores increase where taking into consideration all the DNN
activation layers instead of just the penultimate activation layer. Each attack cluster of bars is divided
to four columns which correspond to the methods (from left to right): DkNN, LID, Mahalanobis, and
NNIF. Our NNIF detector surpasses previous state-of-the-art methods by a large margin for Deepfool
and CW attacks, and matches the Mahalanobis detector’s performance for FGSM and JSMA.
(Section 2) and also to the DkNN adversarial detector (Section 3). Before presenting our results, we
first describe the experimental setup used in our analysis.
4.1 Experimental setup
Training and Testing: Each of the three image datasets was divided into three subsets: training set,
validation set, and testing set, containing 49k, 1k, and 10k images respectively. Since our NNIF
method is time consuming (especially the procedure INFLUENCEFUNCTION in Algorithm 1), we
randomly selected 49k and 1k training and validation samples, respectively, from the official SVHN
training set and 10k testing samples from the official SVHN testing set. Any validation or testing
image not correctly classified by the DNN was discarded. For every image in the validation and testing
sets, we generated adversarial examples using the four attack methods (FGSM, JSMA, DeepFool,
CW), as describe in Step 4 in Algorithm 1. Then, an equal number of normal and adversarial
validation images were used to train a LR classifier, which was later applied on the remaining testing
images for calculating the detectors metrics. We used the cleverhans library Papernot et al. [2018] to
carry out all the adversarial attacks. The image RGB values were scaled to [0, 1].
Since the DkNN method requires a calibration set, we randomly selected 33% of the validation set
examples (after discarding the misclassifications) for calibrating it. Note that although Papernot and
McDaniel showed that the nearest neighbors can qualitatively detect adversarial attacks (see Fig. 7
in Papernot and McDaniel [2018]), they did not formalize an adversarial detector. We employ their
empirical p-values as features for the adversarial detection task.
Training DNNs: We trained all DNNs on the training set while decaying the learning rate using
the validation set’s accuracy score. All the DNNs used in our experiments are Resnet-34 He et al.
[2016] with global average pooling layer prior to the embedding space. The embedding vector was
multiplied by a fully-connected layer for the logits calculation. We trained all three datasets for 200
epochs, with L2 weight regularization of 0.0004, using a Stochastic Gradient Decent optimizer with
momentum 0.9 and Nesterov updates. For evaluation we used the model checkpoint with the best
(highest) validation accuracy on the image classification task. We follow the checklist in Carlini et al.
[2019] and report the full DNN validation/test accuracies for the clean models when not under attack
and the attacks success rates (see supp. material). These DNNs perform close to the state-of-the-art
and thus are sufficient for being used in an adversarial study without fine tuning Feinman et al. [2017].
Parameter tuning: The number of neighbors (k) for LID and DkNN, the noise magnitude () for the
Mahalanobis method, and the number of top influence samples to collect (M ) for NNIF were chosen
using nested cross validation within the validation set, based on the AUC values of the detection
ROC curve. We tuned k for DkNN using an exhaustive grid search between [10, N/#classes],
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Table 1: Comparison of AUC scores (%) for various adversarial detection methods, for FGMS,
JSMA, Deepfool, and CW attacks. Results obtained using all the DNN’s activation layers for
LID/Mahalanobis/NNIF and only the embedding space for DkNN.
Dataset Detector FGSM JSMA Deepfool CW
CIFAR-10
DkNN 87.81 95.37 95.82 96.88
LID 98.18 95.74 95.80 97.82
Mahalanobis 99.80 99.56 97.49 96.48
NNIF (ours) 99.96 99.50 99.32 99.5
CIFAR-100
DkNN 93.65 83.46 76.71 93.77
LID 92.33 78.63 51.61 67.83
Mahalanobis 99.87 96.44 62.05 74.43
NNIF (ours) 99.96 97.50 77.17 96.51
SVHN
DkNN 85.24 94.61 91.13 95.15
LID 99.92 97.06 93.90 95.82
Mahalanobis 100.00 99.91 97.92 99.18
NNIF (ours) 100.00 99.76 99.06 99.59
where N is the dataset size and #classes is the number of classes. For LID the number of nearest
neighbors was tuned using a grid search over the range [10, 40) while using a minibatch size of 100
(as in Ma et al. [2018]). For the Mahalanobis method we tuned  using an exhaustive grid search in
log-space between [1E−5, 1E−2], and M was tuned using a grid search over [10, 500]. The selected
parameters are presented in the supp. material.
Running INFLUENCEFUNCTION in Algorithm 1 for an entire training set is very slow. Thus, for every
testing set we randomly selected only 10k out of the 49k samples in the training set and calculated
Iup,loss (Eq. (1)) just for them. Although this is a coarse approximation of the real nearest neighbors
distribution in the training set on the DNN embedding space, this approximation is sufficient for
achieving new state-of-the-art adversarial detection. We emphasize that this approximation was done
only for the testing set, and not for the validation set.
Activation layers: The LID, Mahalanobis, and NNIF detectors can be trained using either features
from the embedding space alone or using all the activation layers in the network. The DkNN detector
portrays very poor results when it is applied on all the DNN’s features (data not shown) and therefore,
we present all the DkNN results by training features from the embedding space alone.
4.2 Detection of adversarial attacks
Figure 2 shows the discrimination power (AUC score) of the four inspected adversarial detectors:
DkNN (black), LID (blue), Mahalabolis (green) and NNIF (red), on three popular datasets: CIFAR-10,
CIFAR-100, and SVHN. We compare between the detection scores calculated for four adversarial
attacks: FGSM, JSMA, Deepfool, and CW. The solid bars correspond to detections where only
the penultimate activation layer was utilized. In some cases, considering all the layers in the DNN
activations boosts the LID/Mahalanobis/NNIF scores; this is portrayed as a complementary hatched
patterned bar above the solid bar.
Our method surpasses all other detectors for distinguishing Deepfool and CW attacks, for all the
datasets. On FGSM and JSMA our NNIF detector also demonstrates state-of-the-art results, matching
the Mahalanobis detector’s performance. Table 1 summarizes the AUC scores of the detectors using
features from all the DNN’s activation layers. The only exception is the DkNN method, which is
employed only on the embedding space. In the supp. material, we provide a similar table for the
obtained AUC scores using only the DNN’s penultimate layer.
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Table 2: Ablation test for adversarial attack detection: Calculating AUC score and accuracy for
selected features. Attacking CIFAR-10 dataset using Deepfool.
RM↑ DM↑ RM↓ DM↓ AUC(%) acc(%)
82.11 77.03
66.14 61.47
83.25 78.44
99.79 97.68
99.82 97.51
99.79 99.29
99.81 97.34
98.27 96.69
97.73 97.21
98.28 96.73
97.62 97.12
99.79 97.73
99.81 97.78
99.79 97.71
99.82 97.86
4.3 Ablation study
To quantify the contribution of each one of the features (RM↑, DM↑, RM↓, DM↓) on the NNIF
method performance, we conducted an ablation study on CIFAR-10 dataset, detecting FGSM, JSMA,
Deepfool, and CW adversarial attacks. Table 2 shows the AUC and accuracy results for Deepfool
attack using features from the DNN’s embedding space only. The complete table with all the attacks
is presented in the supp. material.
Our analysis shows that the most influential feature is DM↑, which is the L2 distance from the most
helpful training examples on the embedding space. In most cases, our NNIF detector performance
using DM↑ is nearly as good as the performance upon utilizing all four features. The least important
feature isRM↓, which barely helps the adversarial detection. Intuitively it makes sense because we
have noticed that the classes of the most harmful training examples always differ from the normal
examples’ class and mostly differ from the adversarial examples’ class, and thus their rankings (RM↓)
are expected to be high for both cases (normal/adversarial). On the other hand, the distances from
the most harmful training examples (DM↓) are beneficial for the detection. The most helpful ranks
(RM↑) is a beneficial feature when used by itself, alas incorporating it with DM↑ did not improve the
results. We therefore deduce that the information added byRM↑ can already be inferred from DM↑
in our detector.
We also show that the featuresRM↑, DM↑, DM↓ affect every attack differently. We calculated the
probability density functions for these three features on CIFAR-10, applying the Deepfool and CW
attacks (shown in the supp. material). From these histograms it can be easily observed thatRM↑ or
DM↑ are more useful for detecting Deepfool adversarial attacks than CW ones. On the other hand,
the DM↓ feature discriminates CW attacks better than Deepfool ones.
A deployment of any learning based detector on systems is risky since an attacker could potentially
have access to the LR classifier’s parameters. Thus, it is helpful to deploy instead a detector which
inspects only one feature and applies a simple thresholding. Our results show that this scheme is
possible with NNIF using only the DM↑ feature for all attacks.
4.4 Generalization to other attacks
To evaluate how well our detection method can be transferred to unseen attacks, we trained LR
classifiers on the features obtained using the FGSM attack, and then evaluated the classifies on
JSMA, Deepfool, and CW attacks. The AUC scores are shown in Table 3. It can be observed that our
NNIF method shows the best generalization on Deepfool and CW, however the Mahalanobis method
transferred better to the JSMA attack. Table 3 results were collected using only the penultimate layer
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in the DNN (the embedding vector); we provide a similar generalization table with all the DNN layers
in the supp. material. Notice that the generalization is weaker for all methods in this case.
Table 3: Generalization of adversarial detection from FGSM attack to unseen attacks. The LR
classifier is trained on the features extracted after applying FGSM attack, and then evaluated on
JSMA, Deepfool, and CW.
Dataset Detector FGSM JSMA Deepfool CW(seen)
CIFAR-10
DkNN 87.81 94.89 95.21 96.76
LID 90.12 94.67 95.43 97.66
Mahalanobis 96.80 98.95 95.03 89.57
NNIF (ours) 87.75 94.81 97.98 98.98
CIFAR-100
DkNN 93.65 83.16 62.41 92.22
LID 80.68 74.33 52.25 67.84
Mahalanobis 83.90 90.20 59.96 68.72
NNIF (ours) 87.23 80.76 78.82 93.16
SVHN
. DkNN 85.24 93.43 89.84 92.20
LID 88.38 93.93 91.32 94.22
Mahalanobis 98.14 99.00 91.46 87.51
NNIF (ours) 91.06 97.91 95.79 98.16
5 Discussion and conclusions
In this paper, we addressed the task of detecting adversarial attacks. We showed that for normal
(untempered) images, there exists a strong correlation between their nearest neighbors in the DNN’s
embedding space and their most helpful training examples, found using influence functions. Our
empirical results show that the L2 distance from a test image embedding vector to its most helpful
training inputs (DM↑) is a strong measure for the detection of adversarial examples. The aforemen-
tioned distance combined with the nearest neighbors ranking order of the training inputs were used to
achieve a new state-of-the-art adversarial detection performance for sophisticated attacks (Deepfool
and CW) on three datasets: CIFAR-10, CIFAR-100, and SVHN.
One possible avenue for future research is to inspect how the nearest neighbors are correlated with the
most helpful/harmful training examples using different distance metrics or by employing a transform
on the DNN embedding vectors. We emphasize that we used the L2 distance throughout our analysis,
thus, we suspect that using another distance metric such as Mahalanobis Lee et al. [2018] could
improve our results further.
Another open issue for future research is the long computation time, which is required to calculate the
influence functions for the entire training set. It is obvious that in order to deploy our NNIF algorithm,
a significant improvement in computation time is needed, especially for real time applications or
systems, which mandate fast detection pace. A possible solution to this problem may be a form
of hash map from the nearest neighbors to the most influence training examples. Every training
example can be encoded with a probability vector for its influence on a specific class; then, instead of
employing a simple k-NN search in the embedding space, we can average over the probability of
each class.
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A Method
The main paper proposes a new reactive detection method for adversarial images: the Nearest
Neighbors Influence Functions (NNIF). Our detector utilizes a influence functions algorithm as
shown in Koh and Liang [2017] to measure the contribution of each training sample to a test samples
prediction. Their algorithm is summarized in Algorithm 2. For measuring the influence a train sample
z has on the loss of a specific test sample ztest, Koh and Liang [2017] approximate Iup,loss(z, ztest)
in Eq. (1), where H is the Hessian of the machine learning model, L is its loss, and θ are the model
parameters. Eq. (1) is repeated throughout the training set, calculating Iup,loss for every training
sample. For our NNIF algorithm only the top M helpful training examples (H+inds) and the top M
harmful training examples (H−inds) are chosen for further processing.
B Experimental setup
The DNNs clean accuracies, when not under attack, are shown in Table 4. The FGSM, JSMA,
Deepfool, and CW success rates are shown in Table 5. Note that the success rates of all attacks are
higher for CIFAR-100. This makes sense since CIFAR-100 dataset has 100 classes instead of 10, and
it is thus more vulnerable to misclassifications.
The paper explains how we tuned the hyper-parameters for the four inspected algorithms: DkNN,
LID, Mahalanobis, and our NNIF method.
For the DkNN and LID algorithms we tuned the number of neighbors (k), for the Mahalanobis
algorithm we tuned the noise magnitude (), and for our NNIF method we set the number of top
influence samples to collect (M ). All parameters were chosen using nested cross entropy validation
within the validation set, based on the AUC values of the detection ROC curve. The results are shown
in Table 6.
Table 4: DNN clean accuracies (%), for normal images not under attack.
Dataset train acc val acc test acc
CIFAR-10 99.75 93.70 92.08
CIFAR-100 96.80 70.80 67.99
SVHN 99.46 96.20 94.59
C Detection of adversarial attacks
Figure 3 presents two ROC curves for classification of Deepfool and CW adversarial attacks on
the CIFAR-10 dataset. One can observe that our NNIF method (solid red line) achieves better
classification power over the previous state-of-the-art methods.
Table 7 presents the AUC scores for the adversarial detection of FGSM, JSMA, Deepfool, and CW
attacks on CIFAR-10, CIFAR-100, and SVHN datasets. These results was obtained by using DNN’s
Table 5: Adversarial attack success rates (%) of FGSM, JSMA, Deepfool, and CW.
Dataset FGSM JSMA Deepfool CWval test val test val test val test
CIFAR-10 80.47 79.27 71.18 70.21 94.34 96.19 93.70 94.46
CIFAR-100 95.19 95.26 86.02 86.19 100.00 99.91 99.44 98.90
SVHN 84.72 85.51 69.02 65.51 92.62 92.45 93.24 95.69
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Algorithm 2 Influence Functions
Input: Test sample (xi, yi) and a training set (Xtrain, Ytrain)
Input: M : Number of top influence samples to collect
Output: H+inds, H
−
inds . Most helpful/harmful training examples indices
1: Ntrain = |Xtrain|
2: Initialize H+inds=[], H
−
inds=[]
3: Initialize Iup,loss = zeros[Ntrain]
4: for (xj , yj) in (Xtrain, Ytrain) do
5: Iup,loss[j] = −∇θL(xi, θ)TH−1θ ∇θL(xj , θ) . Apply influence function (Eq. (1))
6: end for
7: sort(Iup,loss[j]) . Sorting for the most influential training samples
8: for m in [0,M − 1] do
9: j+m = Training example index of Iup,loss[Ntrain −m] . choosing most helpful examples
10: H+inds.append(j
+
m)
11: j−m = Training example index of Iup,loss[m] . choosing most harmful examples
12: H−inds.append(j
−
m)
13: end for
14: return H+inds, H
−
inds . Most helpful/harmful training examples indices
Figure 3: ROC curves for classifying adversarial examples. (a) Defending Deepfool attack. (b)
Defending Carlini-Wagner (CW) L2 attack. All plots correspond to the CIFAR-10 dataset. We
achieve state-of-the-art results, surpassing previous defense methods by a large margin.
Table 6: Hyper-parameter setting for the four inspected detectors.
Dataset Param FGSM JSMA Deepfool CW
CIFAR-10
DkNN (k) 4900 5000 4900 4900
LID (k) 18 18 18 18
Mahalanobis () 0.0002 0.0002 0.00005 0.00001
NNIF (M ) 50 200 100 200
CIFAR-100
DkNN (k) 490 450 20 430
LID (k) 10 10 10 10
Mahalanobis () 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.00001
NNIF (M ) 30 30 40 40
SVHN
DkNN (k) 3200 3000 1400 3200
LID (k) 18 22 22 22
Mahalanobis () 0.001 0.0005 0.00005 0.00001
NNIF (M ) 300 50 300 50
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features from only the embedding space. A similar table with detectors which were trained on the the
entire DNN’s features is in the main paper.
Table 7: Comparison of AUC scores (%) for various adversarial detection methods, for FGMS, JSMA,
Deepfool, and CW attacks. Results obtained using only the DNN’s penultimate layer.
Dataset Detector FGSM JSMA Deepfool CW
CIFAR-10
DkNN 87.81 95.37 95.82 96.88
LID 90.12 94.67 95.43 97.66
Mahalanobis 96.80 98.95 96.49 96.96
NNIF (ours) 87.75 97.67 99.82 99.05
CIFAR-100
DkNN 93.65 83.46 76.71 93.77
LID 80.68 74.33 52.25 67.84
Mahalanobis 83.90 90.20 62.05 71.60
NNIF (ours) 87.23 86.63 84.20 94.58
SVHN
DkNN 85.24 94.61 91.13 95.15
LID 88.38 94.31 92.00 95.64
Mahalanobis 98.14 99.15 96.07 98.26
NNIF (ours) 91.06 98.29 97.11 98.68
D Ablation study
To inspect how the four learned features influence our adversarial detection we conducted an ablation
study on CIFAR-10 dataset, for all the attacks: fast gradient sign method (FGSM) Goodfellow et al.
[2015], Jacobian-based saliency map attack (JSMA) Papernot et al. [2016], Deepfool Moosavi-
Dezfooli et al. [2016], and Carlini Wagner (CW) attack Carlini and Wagner [2017b]. The results
are shown in Table 8. From these results, one may conclude that the most beneficial feature is DM↑,
which is the L2 distance from the most helpful training examples on the deep neural network (DNN)
embedding space.
Figure 4 shows the probability density functions for RM↑, DM↑, and DM↓ features on CIFAR-10
for the Deepfool and CW adversarial attacks. From these histograms, it can be easily observed that
RM↑ or DM↑ are more useful for detecting Deepfool adversarial attacks than CW attacks. On the
other hand, the DM↓ feature discriminates CW attacks better than Deepfool attacks. This is also
supported by the results on Table 8: For RM↑ or DM↑ alone NNIF detects Deepfool better than CW
(98.27% > 81.91% and 99.79% > 97.27%), however, for DM↓ NNIF is able to detect CW attacks
better than Deepfool attacks (89.97% > 82.11%).
E Generalization to other attacks
The main paper measures the NNIF method transferability from one attack (FGSM) to other, unseen
attacks (JSMA, Deepfool, and CW), where all the features are extracted from the penultimate activa-
tion layer. Here we provide a similar table where all the DNN’s activation layers are employed for
this comparison (Table 9), except of DkNN which only utilizes features from the DNN’s embedding
space.
The generalization results in Table 9 does not have a definite winner method. The DkNN, Mahalanobis,
and our NNIF methods demonstrate the best transferability for various setups. The LID detector does
not generalize as good as the others for any setup.
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Table 8: Ablation test for adversarial attack detection: Calculating AUC score and accuracy for
selected features. Attacking CIFAR-10 dataset using FGSM, JSMA, Deepfool, and CW.
RM↑ DM↑ RM↓ DM↓ FGSM JSMA Deepfool CW
78.99 83.23 82.11 89.97
51.4 51.93 66.14 53.14
82.08 85.11 83.25 90.27
84.19 97.41 99.79 97.27
86.74 97.54 99.82 98.81
84.20 97.41 99.79 97.27
87.74 97.66 99.81 99.0
64.85 85.27 98.27 81.91
80.19 85.4 97.73 95.14
64.31 85.34 98.28 81.95
83.14 85.97 97.62 95.34
84.18 97.43 99.79 97.21
86.66 97.51 99.81 98.85
84.22 97.44 99.79 97.21
87.75 97.67 99.82 99.05
Table 9: Generalization of adversarial detection from FGSM attack to unseen attacks. The LR classifier
is trained on all activation layers’ features extracted after applying FGSM attack, and then evaluated
on JSMA, Deepfool, and CW.
Dataset Detector FGSM JSMA Deepfool CW(seen)
CIFAR-10
DkNN 87.81 94.89 95.21 96.76
LID 98.18 91.70 84.51 91.67
Mahalanobis 99.80 96.11 86.25 85.17
NNIF (ours) 99.96 92.76 79.84 84.44
CIFAR-100
DkNN 93.65 83.16 62.41 92.22
LID 92.33 72.65 51.19 59.09
Mahalanobis 99.87 82.26 52.15 53.72
NNIF (ours) 99.96 89.52 64.33 86.43
SVHN
DkNN 85.24 93.43 89.84 92.20
LID 99.92 94.91 82.55 82.26
Mahalanobis 100.00 99.18 92.24 86.87
NNIF (ours) 100.00 92.45 80.14 83.20
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Figure 4: Probability density functions of the most helpful ranks (RM↑, top row), most helpful
distances (DM↑, middle row), and the most harmful distances (DM↓, bottom row), on CIFAR-10 for
the Deepfool and CW attacks. The features for the normal (untempered) images that were correctly
classified by the network are shown in blue. The features for the adversarial images are shown in
orange. The features for the normal images that were misclassified by the network are shown in green
(in the middle row).
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